なぜアシックスは完全復活しナイキは苦戦を強いられているのか？「やらないことを決める」強みの作り方とは
ASICS fell from long-distance running dominance to a 0% wear rate at the 2021 Hakone Ekiden, then clawed back to a record operating profit of ¥195 billion for fiscal year ending December 2026 by eliminating baseball equipment, swimwear, budget shoes, and every other non-core line. The episode sets that revival against Nike's simultaneous decline—dropped from the S&P 100 after a D2C pivot that surrendered mass-retail shelf space—and closes with ZOZO and Chiba City's 'Neo Cultural Festival,' exploring what school festivals actually develop in young people.
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What this episode answers
Why did ASICS fall to a 0% wear rate at the Hakone Ekiden, and how did it recover?
Nike's 2017 launch of the Vaporfly triggered a thick-sole revolution that ASICS dismissed as a passing fad, causing its Hakone share to collapse to 0% by 2021 and pushing the company to a ¥20 billion net loss in 2018 and an operating loss in 2020; ASICS recovered by cutting all unprofitable lines, concentrating resources on mid-to-high-price running shoes, and developing the Metaspeed series through an internal 'Project C' team, lifting operating profit to a record ¥195 billion and the Hakone wear rate to 29% by 2026.
Why has Nike's performance deteriorated to the point of being removed from the S&P 100?
After CEO John Donahoe shifted Nike away from mass retailers like Foot Locker toward its own app, e-commerce, and direct stores, the vacated shelf space was seized by HOKA, On, New Balance, and ASICS; Nike was removed from the S&P 100 on September 21, 2026, with its market cap down 80% from its peak—a destruction of roughly ¥30 trillion in value.
What does LEGO's crisis and comeback have in common with ASICS's story?
In the early 2000s LEGO diversified into LEGOLAND theme parks, apparel, video games, and licensing until it lost its identity and faced a corporate crisis; after shedding every peripheral business and refocusing solely on its core brick product, LEGO had grown revenue 13 times versus 20 years earlier by 2025, reaching an operating margin of 30% and operating profit of roughly ¥530 billion—a structural parallel to ASICS's path.
How can the idea of 'selection and focus' be applied to individual career design?
Host Tanaka Kei (田中圭) concluded that competing head-on in a crowded field like elite finance is a losing bet, so he built a unique position by combining low-competition axes—an early-morning running habit plus finance × radio personality—which is the same logic as deciding what not to do that drove ASICS's revival.
What educational value do school festivals hold, and does that value carry over into adult organizations?
School festivals surface talents—cost management, organizing people, quiet diligence—that academics and athletics rarely reward; ZOZO's 2026 Neo Cultural Festival gave 54 high schoolers end-to-end ownership of planning, budgeting, decoration, and promotion, and the Shinjuku Mitsui Building's karaoke contest, now in its 49th year with 55 companies and 7,000 spectators, shows that same spirit alive in the corporate world.
ASICS's Fall: The Shock of 0% at the Hakone Ekiden
In 2017, Nike launched the Vaporfly—a carbon-plated, thick-soled shoe that upended the running world. ASICS's leadership judged the thick-sole trend a passing fad and was slow to respond. The brand had once held roughly 30% of the Hakone Ekiden field, but by 2021 not one of the 210 runners wore ASICS—a wear rate of zero. Financials collapsed in tandem: a net loss of ¥20 billion in 2018, followed by an operating loss in 2020.
The Radical Commitment to Stopping Things
The central engine of ASICS's recovery was a relentless discipline about what not to do. The company exited baseball equipment, swimwear, school apparel, and—within running shoes—discontinued virtually all models priced below ¥8,000. Mid-to-high-price running shoes now make up 95% of the product mix.
Manufacturing was overhauled as well, with overseas production—concentrated in Vietnam and Indonesia—raised to 98% of total output. Onitsuka Tiger (オニツカタイガー), the lifestyle-luxury brand within the group, was judged irreconcilable with competitive sport and was fully spun off as a separate company.
With resources concentrated, ASICS assembled its best internal talent in design, quality development, marketing, and intellectual property into a team called Project C, which produced the Metaspeed series. In August 2026 the company upgraded its full-year guidance for the fiscal year ending December 2026 to net sales of ¥1.05 trillion and operating profit of ¥195 billion—both all-time records. The Hakone Ekiden wear rate had climbed back to 29%.
Why Nike's "Selection and Focus" Backfired
Over the same period, Nike pursued what it also called selection and focus—and produced the opposite outcome. On September 21, 2026, Nike was dropped from the S&P 100, the index of the 100 largest U.S. companies. Its market cap had fallen 80% from its peak, wiping out roughly ¥30 trillion in value.
After CEO John Donahoe took over, Nike cut shipments to mass retailers such as Foot Locker and pivoted to a direct-to-consumer (D2C) model built around its own app, e-commerce, and flagship stores. Margins improved briefly, but HOKA, On, New Balance, and ASICS moved quickly to fill the vacated shelf space and capture the lost share. The episode's analysis: ASICS directed every resource at product development, while Nike concentrated on optimizing its sales channel—that difference made all the difference.
LEGO Walked the Same Path
LEGO offers a near-identical case study. In the early 2000s, LEGO expanded into LEGOLAND theme parks, apparel, video games, and a range of licensing deals until the question "what kind of company is LEGO?" had no clear answer, and the business teetered on the brink. It shed every peripheral operation and refocused entirely on its core brick product. By 2025 it had grown revenue 13 times compared to 20 years earlier, achieving an operating margin of 30% and operating profit of roughly ¥530 billion.
The host's reading of both stories: the companies that survived did not change how they sell in pursuit of near-term margins—they asked, from the ground up, what their core value actually was.
What School Festivals Build—From ZOZO's Neo Cultural Festival to the Shinjuku Mitsui Building Talent Show
The second half of the episode turns to the educational value of school festivals. In the summer of 2026, 54 high school students from 13 schools in Chiba City co-organized a "Neo Cultural Festival" (ネオ文化祭) with ZOZO and Chiba City. Beyond booking stages and food stalls, the students handled cost accounting, venue decoration, and social media promotion from start to finish. ZOZO did not supply answers; it guided students through questions—"Why do you want to do this?" and "How will you make it work?"—and made sure every one of the 54 participants had a defined role.
The deeper value of a school festival is the space it opens for talents that classrooms and athletic fields rarely reward: managing numbers, rallying a group, getting things done without recognition.
That spirit carries into adult life. The in-building karaoke contest run by tenant companies of the Shinjuku Mitsui Building (新宿三井ビルディング)—launched in 1975, the year after the building opened—reached its 49th edition in 2026, featuring 88 acts from 55 companies before an audience of 7,000. It functions as a corporate school festival: the stage where employees who never get the spotlight step into the lead. One enduring tradition gives it a fittingly surreal touch—the confetti is made from documents each participating company fed through its own shredder.
Takeaways
- ASICS recovered from a ¥20 billion net loss and 0% Hakone Ekiden share by ruthlessly exiting every non-core business—baseball, swimwear, budget shoes—and concentrating entirely on premium running, reaching a record operating profit of ¥195 billion.
- Nike's D2C pivot surrendered mass-retail shelf space that HOKA, On, and ASICS swiftly captured, illustrating that 'what you stop doing' determines competitive outcomes as much as any positive strategy—and that optimizing sales channels is not the same as investing in the product.
- School festivals—from ZOZO's 2026 Neo Cultural Festival to the 49-year-old Shinjuku Mitsui Building talent show—create rare spaces where people whose talents go unrecognized in conventional settings can take the lead, a principle that works equally well for high schoolers and corporate employees.
This article is edited from a machine transcript of the first 30 minutes of the episode. It is not an official summary — please listen to the episode itself.