# 鳴り物入りで誕生した沖縄のテーマパーク『ジャングリア』。 吹き荒れる逆風と、その現在位置とは？(中山淳雄) - Show: 東京ビジネスハブ - Published: 2026-10-18 - Canonical: https://podc.club/en/episode/1697442115_d5c500a33358.html - Audio: https://pdst.fm/e/pscrb.fm/rss/p/traffic.megaphone.fm/TBS4644282372.mp3 - Source: Edited from a machine transcript of the first 30 minutes of the episode. Not an official summary. Junglia (ジャングリア), the large-scale theme park that opened in Nakijin Village in northern Okinawa in July 2025, has posted roughly 670,000 actual visitors and combined losses of ¥26.2 billion in its first year of operation—far short of its original targets. Entertainment sociologist Nakayama Atsuo (中山淳雄) puts the numbers in context against fifty years of Japanese theme-park history and asks whether the results represent a true collapse or something closer to the industry norm. ## What this episode answers ### How many visitors did Junglia actually attract in its first year, and how large were the losses? Cumulative visitors are reported at around one million, but after removing double-counting with spa users the real figure is estimated at roughly 670,000; operator Japan Entertainment Holdings booked a ¥17.3 billion loss and parent company Katana (刀) a further ¥8.9 billion loss in its fiscal 2026 results. ### What were the main reasons visitor numbers fell so far short of the original targets? The primary cause is location: the park sits about 80 km from Naha in the remote north, and the plan to capture 1.5–2 million visitors as overflow from Churaumi Aquarium—which draws 3–4 million people a year—did not materialise because most tourists were satisfied with the aquarium alone; the absence of a true killer attraction, with the zip-line failing to become a must-do monument, compounded the problem, and the park's unusually high 70% name-recognition in Tokyo may actually have accelerated the spread of negative word-of-mouth. ### How does Junglia's current situation look when measured against the broader history of Japanese theme parks? Among currently operating parks, the average construction cost is ¥24 billion and average annual attendance is 1.2 million; investing ¥70 billion and attracting over 700,000 visitors in year one places Junglia in the lower tier of mid-sized parks—closer to average than to catastrophic failure—and compared with the more than half of 1980s–90s parks of similar scale that closed outright, the park is still standing. ### Why has the backlash against Morioka Tsuyoshi (森岡毅) become so intense? The backlash reflects a decade of uncritical praise for Morioka after he joined USJ in 2011, inflated expectations from his public claim of a '73% success rate', and a string of subsequent setbacks including the closure of Immersive Fort Tokyo after just two years (February 2026) and the disclosure of losses from the Seibu-en Yuenchi investment in 2023–24. ### What does Junglia need to stage a comeback? Nakayama argues that Junglia must first establish a single defining killer attraction—something visitors say 'I came specifically for this'—and second, convert Okinawa's local residents into repeat visitors, as Churaumi Aquarium's ability to sustain 3 million-plus annual visitors is underpinned by repeat visits from prefectural residents; reaching the mid-sized-park average of 1.2 million, or 1.5 times current levels, would put the business on a viable footing. ## Article ## Year-One Numbers: A Reality Well Below Target Junglia opened in Nakijin Village, northern Okinawa, in July 2025—one of the most-watched projects in Japan's entertainment industry, backed by roughly ¥70 billion channelled through Katana, the marketing firm led by Morioka Tsuyoshi. As financial results began arriving in the summer and autumn of 2026, the headline figures made uncomfortable reading. Cumulative visitors stand at approximately one million, but once double-counting with spa users is stripped out, the true figure is estimated at around 670,000—well short of the original target of 1.5–2 million. Japan Entertainment Holdings, the operating company, recorded a ¥17.3 billion loss, while Katana itself added a further ¥8.9 billion loss to its fiscal 2026 accounts. Critical press coverage has followed in quick succession. ## Why the Targets Were Missed: Location and the Limits of Catchment Nakayama's first observation is about geography. Theme parks live and die on the population within a 300-kilometre radius: Tokyo Disneyland draws on a catchment of 30–40 million people; USJ on more than 20 million. Okinawa's annual tourist inflow has a ceiling of roughly 10 million, and Junglia sits some 80 km north of Naha. The business plan assumed that overflow from Churaumi Aquarium—which attracts 3–4 million visitors a year—would deliver something close to half that number. Instead, most tourists found the aquarium sufficient on its own and had little incentive to travel further. The absence of a killer attraction made things worse. The zip-line was promoted as a centrepiece experience, but its limited hourly throughput meant it never became the kind of unmissable monument that compels people to make the trip. Junglia's name recognition in Tokyo hit 70%—comparable to Panasonic or Squid Game—an extraordinary level of awareness for a regional park. Yet that visibility proved double-edged: it gave negative reviews a wider audience than they might otherwise have reached. ## Where Junglia Sits in Theme-Park History: 'Lower-Mid' Is Not Catastrophe Nakayama has studied more than 150 theme parks, and his longer-term perspective reframes the numbers. More than half the parks built during the 1980s and 1990s boom closed within three to five years. Himeji Central Park, Gluck Kingdom in Hokkaido (which operated at roughly 700,000 visitors a year before closing after a decade), and Space World in Fukuoka all drew crowds before disappearing. During the 2000s, twenty to thirty parks funded by local governments at a cost of ¥30–50 billion each attracted 1–1.5 million visitors in their opening year, halved that number the following year, shed another third the year after, and shuttered in year five with accumulated deficits of ¥50–60 billion. Among parks still operating today, the average construction cost is ¥24 billion and average annual attendance is 1.2 million. A park that cost ¥70 billion to build and drew over 700,000 visitors in year one sits in the lower tier of the mid-sized category—not far from the mean rather than in a class of its own. USJ climbed from a sluggish opening to more than 14 million visitors by 2014; Huis Ten Bosch clawed its way back from barely 1 million to over 3.5 million. Opening-year figures are rarely the final word. ## The Structure of the Morioka Backlash: Media's About-Face Morioka spent roughly a decade after joining USJ in 2011 being celebrated as 'the god of marketing'. Critical coverage began accelerating around June 2025. NewsPicksand other outlets reversed course, raising questions about Katana's finances, its contract termination with Marugame Seimen, losses tied to the Seibu-en Yuenchi investment (which surfaced in 2023–24), and the closure of Immersive Fort Tokyo after just two years in February 2026. His public claim of a '73% success rate' amplified the criticism. Nakayama is measured in his response: 'Quantifying a success rate for an original IP with this many variables was always a stretch. Ten years of praise followed by a single year of reversal is not a healthy dynamic.' Resentment over funding from the Cool Japan Fund, preferential treatment for prominent influencers in the launch campaign, and a perception among Okinawan local media that they were sidelined all fed into the broader backlash. ## The Path Back: Local Residents and a Defining Experience Nakayama's recovery scenario is straightforward. Reaching the operating-park average of 1.2 million visitors—a 1.5-times increase from current levels—would put Junglia on a sustainable footing. Two things are required. The first is a single killer attraction. Disneyland succeeded by giving visitors one non-negotiable reason to come—the Cinderella Castle—with rides as a bonus. Junglia needs an equivalent: something so closely identified with the park that it creates its own demand. The second is repeat visits from Okinawa's own residents. Churaumi Aquarium sustains 3 million-plus visitors annually in large part because locals keep coming back. Theme parks are estimated to generate economic ripple effects roughly ten times their revenue—¥10 billion in sales translating into ¥100 billion of local economic impact and 5,000–10,000 jobs. A Junglia failure would damage Okinawa as a whole, which is precisely why local buy-in matters. Nakayama closes with a historical reminder: 'Theme parks are the mixed martial arts of entertainment—a brutal survival contest. Drawing in government support while weathering a backlash is the standard playbook, and this turbulence is a trial every pioneer in the sector has faced.' ## Takeaways - Junglia's first-year reality—roughly 670,000 actual visitors and ¥26.2 billion in combined losses—falls well short of its 1.5–2 million target, but measured against surviving mid-sized parks it is closer to average than to outright failure. - The core problems are structural: a remote northern Okinawa location that caps the catchment, overflow demand from Churaumi Aquarium that did not materialise as expected, and the absence of a single must-do attraction that justifies the journey. - Recovery hinges on creating one defining killer experience and converting local Okinawan residents into regular repeat visitors—getting from 700,000 to the 1.2 million industry average is the minimum viable threshold.